Money illusion and coordination failure by Fehr, Ernst & Tyran, Jean R
University of Zurich
Zurich Open Repository and Archive
Winterthurerstr. 190
CH-8057 Zurich
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2007
Money illusion and coordination failure
Fehr, E; Tyran, J R
Fehr, E; Tyran, J R (2007). Money illusion and coordination failure. Games and Economic Behavior,
58(2):246-268.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Games and Economic Behavior 2007, 58(2):246-268.
Fehr, E; Tyran, J R (2007). Money illusion and coordination failure. Games and Economic Behavior,
58(2):246-268.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Games and Economic Behavior 2007, 58(2):246-268.
Money illusion and coordination failure
Abstract
Economists long considered money illusion to be largely irrelevant. Here we show, however, that
money illusion has powerful effects on equilibrium selection. If we represent payoffs in nominal terms,
choices converge to the Pareto inefficient equilibrium; however, if we lift the veil of money by
representing payoffs in real terms, the Pareto efficient equilibrium is selected. We also show that
strategic uncertainty about the other players' behavior is key for the equilibrium selection effects of
money illusion: even though money illusion vanishes over time if subjects are given learning
opportunities in the context of an individual optimization problem, powerful and persistent effects of
money illusion are found when strategic uncertainty prevails.
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1. Introduction 
 
The rational expectations revolution in the 1970's eradicated the study of money illusion, and 
its implications, from economists’ research agenda for a long time. The rational expectations 
approach assumes that people are rational; and since rational individuals do not exhibit 
illusions there is nothing to study. Money illusion was a concept to be mentioned in courses 
about the history of economic thought but not in actual research endeavors (Howitt 1989). In 
fact, a good recipe to get theory papers rejected by leading journals was to assume that money 
illusion affected individuals' behavior (Tobin 1972).1 More recently, however, some 
economists seem to be willing to reconsider the relevance of money illusion in economics, 
partly because of evidence that nominal wages and prices seem to be rigid (Agell and 
Bennmarker 2002; Akerlof 2002; Bewley 1999; Blinder et al. 1998; Campbell and Kamlani 
1997; Fehr and Tyran 2001; Howitt 2002; Kahn 1997; Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986; 
Shafir, Diamond and Tversky 1997).  
A powerful intuitive argument supports the view that money illusion is largely 
irrelevant for economics, however: the illusion has detrimental effects on peoples' economic 
well-being and they thus have a strong incentive to make illusion-free decisions. Therefore, 
people will ultimately make illusion-free decisions, implying that money illusion has little or 
no impact on aggregate outcomes – at least in the long run. It is the purpose of this paper to 
show that this argument can be seriously misleading because it neglects the strategic 
repercussions of money illusion. We show experimentally that even if learning in the context 
of an individual optimization problem does eventually remove individuals’ money illusion, 
there can be large permanent effects of money illusion in a strategic environment. These 
effects arise because money illusion induces individuals to coordinate on inferior equilibria. 
Once individuals are locked in a bad equilibrium there is no escape, meaning that they 
experience permanent economic losses relative to the efficient equilibrium. Thus, even if 
individual-level money illusion is only a temporary phenomenon in an individual 
optimization task, it can cause permanent real effects in a strategic setting by coordinating 
people on inefficient equilibria.  
                                                 
1 James Tobin (1972: 3) nicely described this situation: “An economic theorist can, of course, commit no greater 
crime than to assume money illusion”. Tobin himself believed that money illusion is relevant.  
 2
A large literature now indicates that a non-negligible share of individuals is typically 
prone to certain forms of bounded rationality (Camerer 1995; Costa-Gomes, Crawford and 
Broseta  2001; Crawford 1997; Goeree and Holt 2001; Kahneman 2003; Stahl and Wilson 
1995; Weizsäcker 2003). By definition, boundedly rational behavior is suboptimal behavior, 
i.e., an agent with a suboptimal response earns less than a fully rational agent for the other 
players' given actions. Thus, the intuitive argument that speaks against the relevance of 
money illusion also speaks against the relevance of any other form of bounded rationality. 
Our results suggest, however, that the existence of boundedly rational agents may have 
strategic repercussions that may, in turn, render bounded rationality relevant for aggregate 
outcomes, even if individual learning in a non-strategic context could, in principle, remove 
the suboptimality of individuals’ choices. Claims about the relevance or irrelevance of 
suboptimal behaviors for aggregate outcomes therefore require a careful analysis of the 
agents’ strategic interactions and cannot solely be made on the basis of intuitions about the 
suboptimality of individual behaviors. 
Our results are based on a series of experiments that implemented a strategic pricing 
game with 3 Pareto-ranked equilibria. The experimental design is based on the 
characterization of money illusion as a framing effect (Shafir, Diamond and Tversky 1997; 
Fehr and Tyran 2001). Money illusion occurs when objectively identical situations cause 
different behavioral patterns depending on whether the situation is framed in nominal or in 
real terms. Accordingly, we capture the impact of money illusion by comparing behavior in a 
condition in which payoff information is provided in real terms to behavior in a condition in 
which payoff information is provided in nominal terms. In the Pareto-dominant equilibrium, 
each subject earns the highest real payoff but the nominal payoff is highest for each subject in 
a different equilibrium. Thus, if we give subjects payoff information in nominal terms they 
may exhibit money illusion by taking nominal payoffs as a proxy for real payoffs and 
coordinate on the equilibrium with highest nominal payoffs. In contrast, if we give subjects 
payoff information in real terms, the situation is transparent and it is clear that they earn the 
most in the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. This means that money illusion is ruled out under 
the real payoff representation while money illusion can play a role under the nominal payoff 
representation by coordinating subjects on a Pareto-inferior equilibrium. Therefore, if money 
illusion has no or little relevance, subjects should play the Pareto-dominant equilibrium both 
under the nominal and the real representation of payoffs.  
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The actual behavior of experimental subjects contrasts sharply with this prediction. 
Under the real payoff representation, most subjects start to play at or close to the Pareto-
dominant equilibrium and nearly all subjects quickly converge to this equilibrium. In contrast, 
not a single subject plays this equilibrium under the nominal payoff representation. In this 
condition, the vast majority of subjects start to play far away from the Pareto-dominant 
equilibrium and they then converge to the inefficient equilibrium with high nominal payoffs. 
As a consequence, subjects’ real earnings under the nominal payoff representation are on 
average almost 50 percent lower than under the real payoff representation. These results 
illustrate that money illusion may be a powerful source of coordination failure, causing 
permanent real effects.  
In a next step, we examined the extent to which individual-level money illusion causes 
the failure to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium. This question is interesting because 
coordination failure in a strategic setting may also arise from the belief that the other players 
have money illusion. If everyone believes that the other players have money illusion and that, 
therefore, the others coordinate on a Pareto-inferior equilibrium with high nominal payoffs, it 
is in everyone's interest to play this equilibrium as well.2 To isolate these (indirect, 
expectations-driven) effects of strategic interaction from the (direct) effects of individual-
level money illusion, we transformed the strategic game into an individual optimization task. 
We implemented a treatment in which each subject plays against pre-programmed computers 
who play a best reply to whatever the human player chooses. In addition, subjects are 
informed about the computers’ response to each of their feasible choices. This means that 
subjects are no longer in a truly strategic situation because no strategic uncertainty exists with 
regard to the other players’ choices. Subjects can maximize their payoffs by unilaterally 
choosing the Pareto-dominant equilibrium, taking the computers’ responses into account. If 
subjects are able to solve this optimization problem better under the real payoff representation 
than under the nominal payoff representation, we have evidence for individual-level money 
illusion.  
The data indicates that a considerable number of subjects indeed suffer from individual-
level money illusion during the first half of the experiment. Towards the end of the 
experiment, most subjects learn to make the optimal decision by choosing the efficient 
equilibrium. This observation shows that money illusion indeed vanishes at the individual 
                                                 
2 This might under some conditions even happen if all agents are fully rational (see Chwe 1999 discussion). 
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level if subjects repeatedly face the individual optimization task. However, repeatedly making 
the same decision in a strategic setting, where subjects face other human players whose 
actions have to be predicted, does not prevent the vast majority of subjects from coordinating 
on an inferior equilibrium. Apparently, it is one thing to pierce the veil of money in an 
individual optimization problem and another thing to escape the impact of money illusion in a 
strategic setting.  
A few other papers have examined the role of money illusion in recent years. Shafir, 
Tversky and Diamond (1997) provided interesting questionnaire evidence indicating that 
money illusion affects both people’s preferences as well as their perceptions of the constraints 
they face. More recently, field evidence has provided empirical support for the effects of 
money illusion on donations (Kooreman, Faber and Hofmans 2004; Cannon and Cipriani 
2004), housing markets (Genesove and Mayer 2001, Brunnermeier and Julliard 2005) and 
stock markets (Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho 2005). 
Fehr and Tyran (2001) have shown that money illusion causes asymmetric price 
adjustment in response to anticipated negative and positive monetary shocks. Money illusion 
strongly retards the adjustment of nominal prices to a unique equilibrium after a negative 
monetary shock, while prices quickly adjust to the new unique equilibrium after a positive 
shock. However, none of the previous papers has considered the effects of money illusion on 
coordination failure, i.e., they did not examine whether money illusion has permanent effects 
on subjects’ behavior. In addition, we go beyond previous work by showing that, despite a 
substantial level of initially prevailing money illusion, this illusion indeed vanishes if the 
decision about equilibrium selection is transformed to a repeated individual optimization 
problem. However, as our results on coordination failure show, this fact is fully compatible 
with powerful and persistent effects of money illusion in a strategic setting.  
We believe that our paper contributes to the debate about equilibrium selection 
principles in games with multiple equilibria. This debate has a strong focus on the principles 
of payoff dominance and risk dominance (Harsanyi and Selten 1988; Cooper et al. 1990; van 
Huyck, Battalio and Beil 1991; Cooper 1999; Anderson, Goeree and Holt 2001; Camerer 
2003; Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels 2004). The principle of payoff dominance is typically 
interpreted as implying that equilibria, which dominate in terms of real payoffs, may have a 
particular attraction power. To our knowledge, no contributor in this debate has yet explicitly 
differentiated between nominal payoff dominance and real payoff dominance. The evidence 
presented in this paper shows, however, that this distinction is crucial. High nominal payoffs, 
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even though associated with low real payoffs, seem to attract a considerable number of 
subjects. This suggests that the principle of nominal payoff dominance should also be taken 
into account in future discussions about equilibrium selection. Equilibria with high nominal 
payoffs may be focal points with a strong attraction power. 
In the next section we describe the experimental design in more detail. Section 3 reports 
the results of our experiments. Section 4 presents the results of a robustness check where we 
examine whether strategic teaching mitigates coordination failure due to money illusion. 
Section 5 summarizes our results and concludes the paper. 
  
2. Experimental Design 
 To study the effects of money illusion on equilibrium selection, we designed a 
symmetric n-player pricing game with three Pareto-ranked equilibria. In this game, each 
subject simultaneously chose a price Pi ∈  {1, 2, …, 30}. We implemented a symmetric game 
because we thought that this would simplify equilibration. In addition, we also chose a simple 
payoff structure where each subjects’ real payoff depended only on the subject’s own price 
and on the average price  of the other n-1 players. This was convenient as it allowed us to 
represent each subject's payoff in a payoff matrix (see Appendix A). The payoff matrix 
showed the subject’s payoff for any combination of the own price P
iP−−
i and the others’ average 
price . Since the game was symmetric, each of the n players in the group had the same 
payoff table, which was common knowledge among the players.  
iP−−
The three equilibria of the game are described in Table 1 below. Equilibrium A arises 
when each subject chooses PA = 4, leading to a real payoff of πA = 28 for each player. In 
equilibrium B, the price is PB = 10 causing a real payoff of 5. Equilibrium C arises when each 
subject chooses PC = 27, leading to a real payoff πC = 21. The players’ best reply functions 
had a non-negative slope: if  increased it was, in general, also in the interest of player i to 
increase his price. For every given level of  player i had a unique best reply. Since the 
game is symmetric, the equilibria in this game in (P
iP−−
iP−−
i, ) space are located at the 
intersection of the best reply function with the 45-degree line. If subjects have adaptive 
expectations and play a best reply to their expectation, equilibrium A and C are stable, and 
equilibrium B is unstable.  
iP−−
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Table 1: The equilibria in the price-setting game 
Equilibrium Equilibrium price 
level 
Real equilibrium 
payoff 
Nominal equilibrium 
payoff 
A PA = 4 πA = 28 PAπA = 112 
B PB = 10 πB = 5 PBπB = 50 
C PC = 27 πC = 21 PCπC = 567 
 
Our price-setting game was implemented in four different treatment conditions (see Table 2).3 
The treatments differed only with respect to the presentation of the payoffs and whether 
subjects played against other subjects or against n-1 pre-programmed computers. The real 
payoff functions were identical across treatments, i.e. the subjects earned the same real payoff 
for any combination of Pi and , regardless of the treatment condition. Subjects’ payoff 
matrix under the real payoff representation showed their payoff in real terms, while their 
payoff matrix showed their nominal payoff under the nominal payoff representation.
iP−−
iP−−
                                                
4 To 
compute the real payoff under the nominal representation, subjects had to deflate their 
nominal payoff by the prevailing level of .5 This was explained to the subjects in detail in 
the experimental instructions (see appendix A).  
The behavioral differences across treatments with a nominal and a real payoff 
representation capture the effects of money illusion. Historically, economists have defined 
money illusion as a violation of the homogeneity postulate. According to this definition, 
money illusion prevails if demand and supply functions are not homogeneous of degree zero 
in all nominal prices (Leontief 1936). If all nominal prices change by the same percentage, 
people’s opportunity set remains constant, so that rational individuals will make the same 
decisions as before the price change. Therefore, the historical definition is based on the 
 
P− iP−
3 The results of an additional treatment are reported in section 3.1. 
4 Appendix A presents the payoff matrix for the real and the nominal case. 
5 We chose the average price of the other n -1 players as the deflator to make the subjects’ task easier compared 
to the case where the overall average price of the group is the deflator. To be able to play a best reply, subjects 
have to predict i− . Therefore, they have to deflate their nominal payoff with the predicted value of − to 
compute their expected real payoff.  
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intuition that rational individuals will make identical choices in objectively identical 
situations (when the objective consumption opportunities remain constant), regardless of the 
fact that nominal prices have changed: The nominal representation of a situation does not 
affect the behavior of rational individuals; if it does, individuals suffer from money illusion. 
In terms of our treatment conditions, this means that money illusion is absent if there are no 
behavioral differences across the nominal and the real payoff representation. 
The main purpose of our pricing game was to create a conflict between two potentially 
important equilibrium selection principles – the principle of real payoff dominance and the 
principle of nominal payoff dominance. This conflict between nominal and real payoff 
dominance is illustrated in Table 1, where the real payoff is highest for every player in 
equilibrium A but the nominal payoff is highest in equilibrium C. In fact, the payoff vector in 
equilibrium A is the only Pareto efficient point in the payoff space which renders equilibrium 
A particularly attractive. The principle of real payoff dominance predicts that equilibrium A is 
selected regardless of whether payoffs are represented in nominal or in real terms because the 
principle assumes that subjects can pierce the veil of money under the nominal representation. 
In contrast, the principle of nominal payoff dominance predicts that equilibrium A is selected 
when payoffs are represented in real terms while equilibrium C is selected under the nominal 
payoff representation. If we indeed observe that players permanently coordinate on 
equilibrium A under the real representation and on equilibrium C under the nominal 
representation, we not only have evidence for the principle of nominal payoff dominance but 
also for the striking claim that money illusion may have permanent real effects.  
It should be noted that we chose the details of our pricing game with the pupose of 
creating a tension between nominal and real payoff dominance. This tension results from the 
fact that the price level is an (endogenous) nominal variable, and increases by more from 
equilibrium A to C than the real payoff falls. We do not claim that the details of our pricing 
game capture common features of oligopolistic pricing games. For example, multiple 
equilibria do not necessarily occur in pricing games and, if they do, a low-price equilibrium 
does not necessarily pareto-dominate other equilibria.6 Therefore, our design should be seen 
                                                 
6 However, it should be noted that such a situation is possible in principle. For example, Adriani et al. (2003) 
claim that the introduction of the Euro (a type of nominal framing that differs from ours) has served as a 
coordination device, inducing a shift of the EU-restaurant industry to a high-price equilibrium. 
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as a clear-cut testing ground for whether money illusion is a coordination device when 
coordination is the main issue.  
When the subjects faced pre-programmed computers, we told them the computers’ 
aggregate reply, i.e., the level of  the computers choose for each of their feasible price 
choices. Thus, each subject was a “Stackelberg-leader” vis à vis the n-1 computers. Each 
computer was programmed to play a best reply to the subject’s choice and to the other 
computers’ choices. Note that since subjects’ knew the computers’ response to each of their 
feasible price choices they faced no strategic uncertainty.
iP−−
7 To maximize their payoff, they had 
to solve an individual optimization problem taking the computers’ aggregate response into 
account. The treatments with computerized opponents therefore measure the extent to which 
subjects can solve this individual optimization problem by choosing the efficient equilibrium 
A.8  
 
Table 2: Experimental Design 
 Payoff representation in 
real terms 
Payoff representation in 
nominal terms 
Human opponents Real treatment with human 
opponents (RH): 13 groups 
with n human players 
Nominal treatment with 
human opponents (NH): 26 
groups with n human players 
Pre-programmed 
computerized opponents 
Real treatment with 
computerized opponents 
(RC): 23 groups with 1 
human and n-1 computerized 
players in each group 
Nominal treatment with 
computerized opponents 
(NC): 22 groups with 1 
human and n-1 computerized 
players in each group 
 
                                                 
7  The absence of strategic uncertainty implies that the outcome space is larger in the strategic game than in the 
individual optimization task. While the outcome space is 30 price choices of i x 30 average price choices by – i 
in the strategic game, it is only 30 price choices by i x 1 best reply by –i. 
8 In standard oligopolistic pricing games, the Stackelberg and Cournot solutions do not coincide. We have 
designed the pricing game in such a manner that they do coincide. It is precisely this design feature that 
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Table 1 shows that equilibrium A dominates the other two equilibria in real terms. However, 
subjects may not be able to play the best equilibrium immediately. They may have to discover 
the best equilibrium when facing human opponents, or their optimal strategy when facing 
computerized opponents. For this reason, we repeated the same game for 30 periods in each 
treatment condition. When subjects faced human opponents, the group composition remained 
constant throughout the 30 periods. In all conditions, subjects were informed about the actual 
average price of the other players, , and about their own real payoff at the end of each 
period. Then they entered the next period where they again chose their prices simultaneously.  
iP−−
                                                                                                                                                        
An important purpose of our treatment conditions was to isolate the role of money 
illusion as an equilibrium selection device from other boundedly rational forms of equilibrium 
selection. The two major conditions in our design are the Real treatment with human 
opponents (RH) and the Nominal treatment with human opponents (NH). The difference 
between these two conditions demonstrates the overall effect of money illusion on 
equilibrium selection. Money illusion can play no role in the RH because by representing 
payoffs in real terms the veil of money is already lifted. Money illusion could cause 
behavioral effects in the NH if, for example, subjects take nominal payoffs as a proxy for real 
payoffs. Thus, if significantly more subjects play the efficient equilibrium in RH compared to 
NH, we have evidence that money illusion affects equilibrium selection.  
The next task then is to examine the mechanism that leads to the selection effects of 
money illusion. In principle, money illusion can effect equilibrium selection in two ways. 
First, there may be direct effects of money illusion on equilibrium selection: subjects may 
play the inefficient equilibrium C because they exhibit individual-level money illusion. 
Second, there may be indirect effects arising from subjects’ expectations about other players’ 
money illusion. Even if no player exhibits individual-level money illusion, most subjects may 
nevertheless have an incentive to play the inefficient equilibrium C if they believe that a 
sufficient number of other players exhibit money illusion and will, therefore, play equilibrium 
C. Our treatments with computerized opponents enable us to isolate the extent to which 
individual-level money illusion directly affects equilibrium selection.  
enables us to isolate the direct and indirect (i.e. expectations-driven) effects of money illusion on coordination. 
 10
In the RC, the real treatment with computerized opponents, we measure the extent to 
which individual-level irrationality other than money illusion affects equilibrium selection. In 
the RC, any deviation from the efficient equilibrium A denotes a non-optimal individual 
choice. In the NC, subjects face an individual optimization problem under the nominal payoff 
representation. The difference in subjects’ price choices between the RC and the NC 
treatment informs us to what extent individual-level money illusion contributes to mis-
coordination. If fewer subjects are able to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium in the NC 
than in the RC, we have evidence that individual-level money illusion is a source of mis-
coordination. 
Finally, our design allows for two other important comparisons: first, the comparison 
between the RC and the RH and, second, the comparison between the NC and the NH. The 
difference between RC and RH measures whether individual irrationality other than money 
illusion is magnified or mitigated by strategic interaction with human players. If, for example, 
subjects play the efficient equilibrium more often in the RH than in the RC, we can conclude 
that strategic interaction with human players weakens the impact of individual irrationality 
other than money illusion on equilibrium selection.  
A particularly interesting result would be obtained if individual irrationality other than 
money illusion played no or almost no role in RH. In this case, the total amount of mis-
coordination in the NH could be attributed to the direct and indirect effects of money illusion. 
Moreover, the difference between NC and NH in this case can be attributed to the indirect 
effects of money illusion arising solely through strategic interaction with human players.9  
The experiments were conducted with the software Z-tree (Fischbacher 1999). A total 
of 174 undergraduate students from the Universities of Zürich, St. Gallen, and Innsbruck 
participated in the treatments described in Table 2. On average, an experimental session lasted 
                                                 
9  More generally, the indirect effects of money illusion can be measured by comparing the price difference 
between RH and RC with the price difference between NH and NC. The difference between NH and NC 
measures the indirect effects of all individual irrationalities because both money illusion and other individual 
irrationality can play a role in the nominal treatments. The difference between RH and RC measures only the 
indirect effects of individual irrationality that have nothing to do with money illusion. Thus, by subtracting the 
price difference between RH and RC, PRH – PRC, from the price difference between NH and NC, PNH – PNC, we 
isolate the indirect effects of money illusion on prices. Note, that if PRH – PRC ≤ 0, the indirect effects of 
money illusion are given by (PNH – PNC) – (PRH – PRC) which is greater than or equal to PNH – PNC. Therefore, 
the whole difference between PNH and PNC can be attributed to the indirect effects of money illusion.  
 11
45 minutes and subjects earned CHF 31.20 (≈ US $ 25). Subjects were randomly allocated to 
groups of n = 5 or n = 6 players. They received written instructions explaining the procedures 
of the experiment, and nominal or real payoff matrices depending on the treatment condition 
(see Appendix A). The calculation of real payoffs based on the nominal payoffs shown on the 
payoff matrix was carefully explained in the NC and the NH. Subjects were allowed to ask 
questions before the experiment started. In each period they had to simultaneously choose a 
price Pi  {1, 2, …, 30}. In addition, they had to indicate their expectation of  in the 
treatments with human opponents in each period.  
∈ iP−−
                                                
 
3. Results 
We start our discussion of results with the comparison of the NH and the RH. We summarize 
this comparison in  
 
Result 1:  In the Nominal treatment with human opponents (NH), initially chosen prices are 
high and all groups eventually converge to the inefficient equilibrium C, whereas 
initially chosen prices are low and all groups converge to the efficient equilibrium 
A in the Real treatment with human opponents (RH).  
 
Figure 1 and Tables 3 and 4 provide support for Result 1. Figure 1 and Table 3 show the 
evolution of average prices across NH and RH. The figure illustrates that a large gap in 
average prices across treatments already arises in period 1 – the average price in the NH is 
20.1 in the first period whereas it is 8.4 in the RH. This difference is highly significant (p < 
.0001) according to a Mann-Whitney test using individual prices as a unit of observation. It is 
noteworthy that in RH almost two thirds (63.5 percent) of all subjects chose exactly PA = 4 in 
the first period while not a single subject chose this price in NH (see first line of Table 4).  
 Moreover, the average price quickly converges towards the efficient equilibrium PA = 
4 in the RH whereas a steady convergence to the inefficient equilibrium PC = 27 occurs in the 
NH.10 From period 4 onwards, the average price in the RH is always extremely close to PA = 
 
10 Period-wise Mann-Whitney tests with group average prices as the units of observation indicate significant 
 12
4 and the hypothesis that subjects play the efficient equilibrium can only be rejected (at the 10 
percent significance level) in periods 1 and 2.11  
Table 4 presents the percentage of subjects who play the efficient equilibrium. This 
table makes clear how radically different individuals’ price choices in the NH and the RH are. 
Throughout the 30 periods, there is not a single case in which a subject chose the efficient 
equilibrium in the NH, while 64 percent of the subjects already opted for PA = 4 in period 1 in 
the RH. From period 7 onwards more than 90 percent of the subjects chose the efficient 
equilibrium in the RH. In contrast, a relatively slow convergence to the inefficient equilibrium 
PC = 27 occurs in the NH. Initially, only 18 percent of the subjects chose PC = 27 but 38 
percent already played this equilibrium in period 10, and reaching 68 percent in period 20 and 
84 percent in period 30. The reason for the slower equilibration in the NH is that some 
subjects seem to have understood that there is a better equilibrium. These subjects deliberately 
chose occasionally very low prices to induce the other group members to also choose low 
prices (see section 3.1. for a discussion of strategic teaching). 
Naturally, the divergence between the NH and the RH is reflected in the real payoffs the 
subjects earned. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 show that subjects earn considerably less in the 
NH than in the RH in all periods. Recall from Table 1 that the real equilibrium payoff in the 
efficient equilibrium is 28, while if subjects play the inefficient equilibrium C they only earn 
21. There is rarely a period in which subjects do not earn at least 10 units more on average in 
the RH. This indicates that the mis-coordination in the NH goes beyond the fact that subjects 
coordinated on an inefficient equilibrium. The large payoff difference is partly caused by the 
slower convergence towards the equilibrium, i.e., by the larger incidence of disequilibrium 
play in the NH.  
The striking price divergence across the NH and the RH suggests that money illusion 
has powerful effects on equilibrium selection. The mere fact that payoffs are represented in 
nominal terms induces subjects to predominantly choose the equilibrium with the higher 
nominal but the lower real payoff. How can this fact be explained? The movement of price 
                                                                                                                                                        
differences (p < .001) between RH and NH in every period.  
11 This is indicated by period-wise t-tests with group average prices as the units of observation. From period 3 
onwards the p-values for the null hypothesis of equilibrium play exceed the 10 percent level.  
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expectations across treatments provides a first hint (see the graphs with empty circles and 
diamonds in Figure 1). Average price expectations were clearly different in RH and NH 
already in the first period, and the average price path in both the RH and the NH closely 
tracks subjects’ average expectations of . Since most subjects played a best reply to their 
expectation about  this expectation is a decisive determinant of subjects’ price choices.
iP−−
iP−−
iP−−
iP−− iP−−
iP−−
iP−−
                                                
12 
Therefore, the strong divergence of the subjects' price expectations, which was already 
apparent in period 1, is of great interest – they expected on average a value of 20.0 for  in 
the NH, whereas they expected a value of 8.2 in the RH. Not a single subject (out of 77) 
expected  = 4 in period 1 in the NH and only 1 subject expected  = 5. In contrast, 48.1 
percent (25 out of 52) held equilibrium expectations of  = 4 in the RH and an additional 
11.5 percent (6 out of 52) expected  = 5 in period 1. These differences in expectations are 
highly significant (Mann-Whitney test, p < .0001).  
We may consider the within-group variance of prices, expectations and expectation 
errors as proxies for strategic uncertainty in a group. The reason is that if a group is perfectly 
coordinated, i. e., if subjects have equilibrium expectations and play best replies to their 
expectations, , the respective variances will be zero. Note that these proxies converge to zero 
when individual expectations and actions converge, which holds irrespective of which 
equilibrium a group coordinates on. Indeed, all three proxies converge to zero in the RH, and 
all proxies tend to be higher in NH than in RH. For example, the variance of price choices 
(averaged over all groups) is 59.5 in NH and 46.6 in RH in period 1, falls to 25.7 in NH and 
4.0 in RH in period 3, and is still at 18.1 in NH but is close to zero (0.8) in RH after 5 periods. 
Similarly, the variance of expectations (averaged over all groups) is 42.6 and 37.5 in period 1, 
19.1 and 5.2 in period 3, and 10.0 and 6.2 in period 5 in NH and RH, respectively. The 
variance of expectation errors is 66.7 and 60.0 in period 1, 29.6 and 5.3 in period 3, and 16.4 
and 5.6 in period 5 in NH and RH, respectively. 
So far our analysis suggests that the nominal representation of payoffs causes 
significantly higher price expectations which in turn induce subjects to choose significantly 
higher prices in the NH. This raises the question whether there were indeed subjects who 
 
P−
P
12 If a subject is uncertain about the true value of i−  the calculation of the best reply requires, of course, taking 
the subjective distribution of i−− P−
iP−
 and not only the expectation of i−  into account. However, for simplicity, 
in the following we will use the term “best reply” in the sense of a best reply to the expectation of − . 
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failed to see through the veil of money or whether the higher expectations in the NH were 
solely rooted in subjects’ beliefs about other players’ money illusion. To examine the 
existence of individual-level illusion we turn to  
 
Result 2:  Only a minority of subjects initially plays the efficient equilibrium in the Nominal 
treatment with computerized opponents (NC), whereas a large majority of 
subjects plays the efficient equilibrium from the beginning in the Real treatment 
with computerized opponents (RC). However, the differences between the NC and 
the RC become small and insignificant over time.  
 
We provide support for Result 2 by means of Figure 2 and Tables 3 to 5. In Figure 2, we 
depict the evolution of average prices in the RC and the NC. To facilitate comparison with the 
previously discussed treatments, we also included the average prices of the RH and the NH. 
Figure 2 and Table 3 show that the average price in the NC in the first 15 periods lies between 
4 and 12 units higher than in the RC. Yet, the price difference diminishes to only 2-3 units 
from period 16 onwards. A similar picture emerges if we look at the frequency with which the 
efficient equilibrium is played (see Table 4). Almost two thirds of all subjects already play the 
efficient equilibrium in period 1 of the RC and the frequency of equilibrium play from period 
10 onwards is rarely below 80 percent. In the NC, only 22.7 percent of the subjects play the 
efficient equilibrium in period 1 and it takes 16 periods until roughly two-thirds of the 
subjects play PA = 4. Finally, we also conducted period-wise Mann Whitney tests of the null 
hypothesis that subjects’ price choices are identical across the RC and the NC. Table 5 
indicates that the null hypothesis can be rejected for the majority of the first 15 periods. From 
period 16 onwards, the null hypothesis can no longer be rejected.  
Because conditions NC and RC are individual optimization tasks, it is costless for 
subjects to “jump” from one equilibrium to the other across periods. A sequence of choices 
close to or at equilibrium C followed by a jump to equilibrium A in period t + 1 can be taken 
as an indication that the subject learned about the existence of the Pareto-dominant 
equilibrium A in period t. To test, we only consider subjects who are likely to have been 
prone to money illusion in the first period (i.e. they chose prices of at least 20), and count 
instances in which subjects jump from PC to PA. We obtain the following: In NC, there are 10 
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(out of 22) subjects who jump to equilibrium A. Six of these jumps occur before period 10, 
the last jump is observed in period 21. In RH, there are only 3 (out of 23) subjects who jump, 
and all jumps occurred before period 7. There are only a few cases in which subjects seem to 
“search” the payoff table (i.e. chose disequilibrium prices), and the incidence of such 
disequilibrium behavior is larger in NC than in RC. In NC, 3.4 percent of all choices are in 
disequilibrium in the first 10 periods, and this percentage falls to 1.0 in the last 10 periods. In 
contrast, the corresponding number is 1.5 percent in the first 10 periods and drops to 0.3 
percent for the last ten in RC. 
Taken together, the evidence suggests that the nominal representation causes 
significantly more problems for the subjects in solving the individual optimization problem. 
This provides direct evidence for individual-level money illusion. Yet, over time subjects 
increasingly learn to see better through the veil of money and solve the optimization problem 
in the NC roughly in the same way as in the RC. This result seems to provide a justification 
for economists’ reluctance to take money illusion seriously because if subjects have 
inexpensive individual learning opportunities, individual-level money illusion largely 
disappears over time. We show, however, that even if individual-level money illusion only 
exists temporarily it may nevertheless contribute to the selection of inefficient equilibria or it 
may strongly retard adjustment towards a unique equilibrium as shown in Fehr and Tyran 
(2001). The reason why the conclusion that money illusion is irrelevant is premature is that 
strategic interaction with human players may magnify individual-level irrationality. For this 
reason we next examine how strategic interaction in the RH affects individual irrationality 
other than money illusion.  
 
Result 3:  Strategic interaction with human players in the treatments with a real payoff 
representation increases the frequency with which the efficient equilibrium is 
played and, eventually, removes almost all inefficiencies.  
 
Figure 2 and Table 3 show that the average price in the RC and the RH in period 1 is almost 
identical. After period 1, the average price quickly converges to the efficient equilibrium in 
the RH while it fluctuates between 2 and 4 units above the efficient equilibrium in the RC. In 
Table 5, we have conducted period-wise Mann Whitney tests of the null hypothesis of equal 
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average group prices across the RC and the RH. Occasionally, the difference is significant 
(e.g. in periods 2, 10, and 15) but the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in most periods. 
Nevertheless, the relative frequency with which the efficient equilibrium is played is higher in 
the RH than in the RC in most periods (see Table 4). In period 1, 65.2 percent of the 
individuals in the RC and 63.2 percent of subjects in the RH play the efficient equilibrium but 
from period 5 onwards the frequency of efficient equilibrium play is always higher in the RH, 
reaching 98 percent in the final 4 periods. Thus, although the difference between the RC and 
the RH is small, it persists over time. This indicates that there is a small amount of individual-
level irrationality in the RC, which is caused by 10-15 percent of the subjects. This 
irrationality in behavior is largely removed in the RH.  
 The discussion above suggests that when payoffs are represented in real terms, 
strategic interactions with human players do not magnify but remove the impact of individual-
level bounded rationality on mis-coordination. A possible interpretation of this result is that 
the imitation of other human players enhances adjustment towards the equilibrium in the RH. 
Recall that in the RH, most players quickly play the Pareto-efficient equilibrium. This 
information is transmitted to the subjects at the end of each period, so that the less than fully 
rational subjects can easily imitate the others’ behavior. Such imitation is not possible in the 
RC where each subject has to calculate the response of the computerized players to his or her 
own choice. An alternative interpretation is that rational play is easier in the RH than in the 
RC if the vast majority of human opponents plays the Pareto efficient equilibrium. In this 
case, strategic uncertainty about the others’ behavior is virtually absent and it is, therefore, 
easy for the less intelligent players to best reply to the “given” average price of the others. 
Since the average price of the other (computerized) players in the RC cannot be taken as 
given, no such easy solution exists for the less intelligent players. In view of the fact that 
strategic interaction in the RH facilitates full adjustment towards the efficient equilibrium 
relative to the RC, a comparison of people's behavior in the NC and the NH is of interest: 
 
Result 4:  Under the nominal payoff representation, strategic interaction with human players 
causes a large increase in the frequency with which the inefficient equilibrium C is 
played, and it completely eliminates play of the efficient equilibrium from the 
beginning.  
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We again refer to Figure 2 and Tables 3 to 5 to support this result. Figure 2 and Table 3 
indicate that the average price in the NC and the NH are relatively close together in the first 
two to three periods. However, whereas the average price rises steadily in the NH, it falls in 
the NC, generating a sharply increasing price difference. This gradual divergence in average 
prices is reflected in period-wise Mann Whitney tests presented in Table 5. During the first 8 
periods, the null hypothesis of equal average group prices across NC and NH cannot be 
rejected but afterwards prices are always significantly different. The reason for the diverging 
price movements is that subjects learn to choose the efficient equilibrium in the NC whereas 
groups increasingly coordinate on the inefficient equilibrium in the NH. In the NC, the 
frequency of playing the efficient equilibrium rises from 22.7 percent in period 1 to 81.8 
percent in period 30, while the frequency of playing the inefficient equilibrium C in the NH 
rises from 18.2 percent in period 1 to 84.4 percent in period 30.  
In our view, the comparison between the NC and the NH is exciting because it suggests 
that most subjects do learn to play the efficient equilibrium when they are provided with 
individual learning opportunities and when they are not entrapped in the attraction power of 
an inefficient equilibrium (see also our discussion of “jumping” behavior following Result 2). 
Thus, individual learning largely removes the power of the veil of money over subjects’ 
behavior in an environment where beliefs about the opponents’ money illusion are rendered 
irrelevant. However, when subjects play the pricing game with other humans, the initially 
prevailing level of money illusion throws subjects in the basin of attraction of the inefficient 
equilibrium from which no escape seems possible. The inefficient equilibrium slowly but 
relentlessly attracts the subjects’ behavior. This development is also associated with a shift in 
the relative importance of the direct and the indirect effects of money illusion. Initially, during 
the first few periods, the difference in prices between the NC and the NH is small, suggesting 
that individual-level money illusion initially dominates subjects’ behavior in both treatments. 
Over time, individual-level illusion declines in the NC but the overall effect of money illusion 
nevertheless increases as indicated by the rising frequency with which the inefficient 
equilibrium is played in the NH. This suggests that the indirect effects of money illusion, 
which operate via subjects’ price expectations, become increasingly important over time.  
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4. Strategic teaching and coordination failure – a robustness check 
Our results in the NC show that roughly one fifth of the players played the efficient 
equilibrium from the beginning. Moreover, over time this percentage increases – in period 8, 
for example, already 55 percent of all players play the efficient equilibrium in the NC. These 
findings suggest that there were also some players in the NH who knew that C is the Pareto-
dominated equilibrium. If this is correct, one would expect to observe some attempts at 
“strategic teaching”, which means that the sophisticated players tried to motivate the 
unsophisticated (still illuded) players to coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium A. 
According to Camerer, Ho and Chong (2002: 139) “Sophisticated players matched with the 
same players repeatedly usually have an incentive to ‘‘teach’’ adaptive players, by choosing 
strategies with poor short-run payoffs which will change what adaptive players do, in a way 
that benefits the sophisticated player in the long run.” 
We indeed observe some attempts at strategic teaching in NH, but these attempts were 
all unsuccessful. One might speculate that these attempts were unsuccessful because strategic 
teaching is impeded by the fact that players could only observe the average (i.e. aggregated) 
price choices of other players, but not their individual price choices. In this section, we report 
the results from a control treatment NH in which subjects are given disaggregated 
information about price choices (i.e. each subject is informed about all individual price 
choices). This treatment is henceforth called “NH(disaggregated)”. 
To illustrate the hypothesis that aggregated information (i.e. players only know the 
average of others’ price choices) limits the incentives for strategic teaching, suppose a group 
is coordinated on the Pareto-dominated equilibrium C in period t. Suppose the group (with n = 
6) consists exclusively of players who have learned that equilibrium A is Pareto-dominant. 
Suppose an illusion-free player i chooses PA = 4 in t + 1. In NH with aggregated information, 
the other –i players only observe that the average price has fallen from PC = 27 in t to 22 in t + 
1 but they do not know why it has fallen. They are uncertain about whether, for example, all 
other players have chosen Pi = 22 or whether one has chosen PA and the others PC. In NH, an 
illusion-free player can therefore not effectively signal to other players that he in fact is 
illusion-free, and this might reduce the incentives for this player to send this (costly) signal. In 
NH(disaggregated), in contrast, the illusion-free players will realize that there is (at least one) 
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other illusion-free player upon observing the choice of PA which might motivate them to 
choose PA, too. 
In fact, the slow convergence to equilibrium C observed in NH is to some extent due to 
fruitless attempts of illusion-free agents to induce other group members to select equilibrium 
A. To illustrate, consider the extreme example of group 10 in NH. This group had an average 
price of 15.6 in period 1 and converged slowly towards equilibrium C by approximate best-
reply dynamics. In period 8, the average group price was 21.4. For the next 6 periods, player 
number 5 choose P5 = 1, inducing the rest of the group to choose lower prices. By period 16, 
the group average price had fallen to 3.8, but the group was still not coordinated on 
equilibrium A (in fact, player #5 was the only player who chose P5 = 4 in this period). In 
period 17, player #4, perhaps frustrated from a long streak of low disequilibrium payoffs, 
chose a price of 29. The group then seems to have responded to his “teaching” since the 
average group price eventually converged to the bad equilibrium C (however, the group failed 
to fully coordinate even in period 30). This somewhat extreme example illustrates that there 
were occasional attempts of strategic teaching in NH but these attempts were not successful 
since all groups eventually converged to the Pareto-dominated equilibrium C. We now 
discuss whether providing players with disaggregated information about price choices in 
NH(disaggregated) makes strategic teaching more successful.  
The treatment NH(disaggregated) was run with additional 36 subjects in 6 groups of n = 
6 (undergraduates at the University of Copenhagen) under otherwise identical conditions as in 
NH. Figure 3 shows average prices for each group in NH(disaggregated). As can be seen from 
the figure, average group prices were relatively high in the first period and not much 
dispersed (group averages range from 17.3 to 23.3, and the overall average price of 19.7 was 
very close to the average in NH of 20.1). Four groups then converge quite quickly, and 2 
groups converge rather slowly, to the Pareto-dominated equilibrium C.  
Group 3 is particularly interesting from the perspective of strategic teaching (see bold 
line in Figure 3). This group was perfectly coordinated on equilibrium C in periods 8 to 10. In 
period 11, however, player #6 chose P6 = 4 while the other players continued to choose high 
prices. In period 12, the teaching of player #6 (who again chose 4) seems to have induced 
player #1 to also choose a price of 4. In period 13, already 4 players chose Pi = 4 while the 
remaining two players chose best replies to their (now low) expectations. That is, in period 
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13, there apparently were at least 4 illusion-free players in the group. Period 14 is then the 
first period in which perfect coordination on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium A was achieved 
in this group. 
While the previous paragraph documents an exciting example of successful strategic 
teaching, it should be clear from the Figure 3 that this is an exceptional case. Strategic 
teaching was successful only in 1 out of 6 groups in NH(disaggregated). In the two groups 
that eventually converged to equilibrium C (see groups 5 and 6 in Figure 3) there were some 
players who repeatedly chose Pi = 4 (i.e., they chose actions that were not best replies to their 
short-run beliefs) in attempting to teach the group, but their efforts were in vain. For example, 
in group 5, there were two illusion-free players choosing PA = 4 in periods 3 and 4, but this 
was not sufficient to induce the other, probably illuded, players to coordinate on the Pareto-
dominant equilibrium A. Instead, the group perfectly coordinated on the Pareto-dominated 
equilibrium C from period 16 on. 
Overall, lock-in was strong and strategic teaching mostly unsuccessful in our setting 
even when subjects were provided with disaggregated information about other players’ price 
choices. We believe that it would be interesting for further research to investigate the effects 
of playing the game for more periods (increasing the benefits from strategic teaching because 
there are more periods left in which on is coordinated on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium). In 
addition, we think that communication (which could be an alternative to strategic teaching, 
see Brandts and Cooper 2005) or collective action (which would enable a majority of 
sophisticated players to overrule the illuded players and directly “jump” to Pareto-dominant 
equilibrium, see Capra et al. 2005) are potentially promising institutions to break the 
persistent lock-in on the Pareto-dominated equilibrium we observe. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper shows that seemingly innocuous differences in the payoff representation have 
powerful effects on equilibrium selection. When payoffs are represented in nominal terms, 84 
percent of the subjects eventually converge to a Pareto inferior equilibrium while 98 percent 
of the subjects finally play the Pareto efficient equilibrium under the real payoff 
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representation. This constitutes clear and powerful evidence for the behavioral relevance of 
money illusion. In particular, our results suggest that nominal payoff dominance is an 
equilibrium selection principle which drives behavior in strategic settings. We also show that 
persistent effects of money illusion occur despite the fact that most individuals are eventually 
able to pierce the veil of money when they are given repeated individual learning 
opportunities. Thus, the argument that the impact of money illusion on aggregate outcomes 
will eventually vanish through learning, can be seriously misleading. In our context, it is 
misleading because learning in strategic environments with multiple equilibria may be 
difficult or impossible or, if it occurs, it may be too late to have much impact on the aggregate 
outcome. 
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Appendix A 
Appendix A: Instructions 
 
[The original instructions were in German. The instructions below refer to the nominal 
treatment with human players (NH). The subjects received the instruction below and the 
nominal payoff matrix.] 
Welcome to the experiment. Please read these instructions carefully. You can earn money in 
this experiment. During the experiment, we calculate your income in points. All points you 
earn during the experiment will be converted into Swiss Francs according to the exchange 
rate: 10 points = 0.40 Francs. 
Please do not communicate with other participants during the experiment. Please ask us if 
you have questions.  
This experiment has 30 periods. All participants are members of a group. Your monitor 
indicates the number of people in your group. You do not know who is in your group but the 
composition of the group remains stable throughout the experiment. Only the decisions in 
your group are relevant for your earnings. Decisions by other groups are irrelevant for you. 
All group members are in the role of firms. In each period, all firms must simultaneously set 
a price from 1 to 30 (1 and 30 included). How much a firm earns depends on the price it 
chooses and on the average price all other firms in the group choose. 
The income table shows your nominal point income. All firms have the same tables. 
Example: Suppose you choose a price of 15 and the other firms choose prices of 16 on 
average. In this case your nominal point income is 48 points.  
For the determination of your earnings at the end of the experiment, only the real point 
income is relevant. This holds for all firms. To calculate your real point income from your 
nominal point income, you have to divide the nominal point income by the average price of 
other firms. Therefore, the nominal and the real point income are related as follows: 
Real point income = Nominal point income / Average price of other firms 
In the example above, your nominal point income is 48 points, but you real point income is 3 
points (= 48 points / 16). 
Here is how the experiment proceeds: At the beginning of each period, you choose a selling 
price (a number from 1 to 30) and indicate which average price of other firms you expect. At 
the end of each period you are informed about the actual average price of the other firms and 
about your actual real point income.  
Do you have any questions? 
 
Appendix A 
The decisions of other firms 
[This decision sheet was only given to subjects in the NC and the RC] In this experiment, the 
decisions of other firms will not be taken by other participants but by pre-programmed 
computers. These computers choose their prices depending on your choice. The table 
below shows how the computers respond to your pricing decision.  
 
Your price choice Average price of other 
(computerized) firms 
1 4 
2 4 
3 4 
4 4 
5 4 
6 4 
7 4 
8 5 
9 6 
10 10 
11 14 
12 15 
13 16 
14 17 
15 18 
16 19 
17 20 
18 21 
19 22 
20 23 
21 24 
22 25 
23 26 
24 27 
25 27 
26 27 
27 27 
28 27 
29 27 
30 27 
 
Appendix A 
 
         
Table A1: Payoff table in the nominal treatments (NH and NC)  
Average price of other firms 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
selling price                             
1 13                              11 11 15 19 15 13 12 11 10 11 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
2 24                              25 19 25 32 22 16 14 12 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
3 13                              48 44 58 73 37 23 16 13 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
4 6                              25 84 112 140 84 39 22 15 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
5 3                              11 44 58 73 162 88 37 19 12 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
6 2                              7 19 25 32 84 168 80 29 12 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
7 2                              5 11 15 19 37 88 152 59 14 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
8 2                              4 8 10 13 22 39 80 108 18 14 15 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 25 26 27 28 30 31 32
9 1                              3 6 8 10 15 23 37 59 30 17 16 17 17 18 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
10 1                              3 5 7 9 12 16 22 29 50 22 19 18 18 19 19 20 21 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
11 1                              3 5 6 8 10 13 16 19 30 39 26 22 21 20 20 21 21 22 23 24 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
12 1                              3 4 6 7 9 11 14 15 18 66 48 31 25 23 22 22 22 23 23 24 25 26 27 27 28 29 30 31 32
13 1                              2 4 5 7 8 10 12 13 14 39 84 59 36 29 25 24 24 24 24 25 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
14 1                              2 4 5 6 8 9 11 12 12 22 48 104 70 42 32 28 26 26 26 26 26 27 28 28 29 30 31 32 33
15 1                              2 4 5 6 8 9 10 11 12 17 26 59 126 83 48 36 31 29 28 27 27 28 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
16 1                              2 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 11 14 19 31 70 150 96 54 40 34 31 30 29 29 29 30 30 31 33 33 34
17 1                              2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 13 16 22 36 83 176 111 61 44 36 33 32 31 31 31 31 32 34 34 35
18 1                              2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 15 18 25 42 96 204 126 68 48 40 36 34 33 32 32 34 35 35 36
19 1                              2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 10 12 14 17 21 29 48 111 234 143 76 53 43 38 36 35 34 35 37 37 37
20 1                              2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 10 12 13 15 18 23 32 54 126 266 160 84 57 46 41 38 36 38 39 39 38
21 1                              2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 10 12 13 15 17 20 25 36 61 143 300 179 92 62 49 43 40 42 43 42 41
22 1                              2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 10 12 13 14 16 19 22 28 40 68 160 336 198 101 67 53 46 48 50 46 44
23 1                              2 3 4 5 6 8 9 9 10 11 13 14 16 18 20 24 31 44 76 179 374 219 110 73 57 59 61 54 49
24 1                              2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 13 14 15 17 19 22 26 34 48 84 198 414 240 120 78 81 84 67 57
25 1                              2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 15 17 18 21 24 29 36 53 92 219 456 263 130 135 140 93 71
26 1                              2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 15 16 18 20 22 26 31 40 57 101 240 500 286 297 308 157 99
27 1                              2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 15 16 18 19 21 24 28 33 43 62 110 263 546 567 588 348 168
28 1                              2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 16 17 19 21 23 26 30 36 46 67 120 286 297 308 667 375
29 1                              2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 16 17 19 20 22 24 27 32 38 49 73 130 135 140 348 720
30 1                              2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 20 21 23 26 29 34 41 53 78 81 84 157 375
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 Table A2: Payoff table in the real treatments (RH and RC) 
Average price of other firms 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
selling price                             
1 13                              6 4 4 4 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 24                              13 6 6 6 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 13                              24 15 15 15 6 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 6                              13 28 28 28 14 6 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 3                              6 15 15 15 27 13 5 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 2                              4 6 6 6 14 24 10 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
7 2                              3 4 4 4 6 13 19 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
8 2                              2 3 3 3 4 6 10 12 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
9 1                              2 2 2 2 3 3 5 7 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 1                              2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 5 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
11 1                              2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
12 1                              2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 6 4 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
13 1                              1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 4 7 5 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
14 1                              1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 8 5 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
15 1                              1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 5 9 6 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
16 1                              1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 5 10 6 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
17 1                              1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 6 11 7 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
18 1                              1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 6 12 7 4 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
19 1                              1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 7 13 8 4 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
20 1                              1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 7 14 8 4 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
21 1                              1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 8 15 9 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
22 1                              1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 8 16 9 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 1
23 1                              1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 9 17 10 5 3 2 2 2 2 2
24 1                              1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 9 18 10 5 3 3 3 2 2
25 1                              1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 4 10 19 11 5 5 5 3 2
26 1                              1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 4 10 20 11 11 11 5 3
27 1                              1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 5 11 21 21 21 12 6
28 1                              1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 5 11 11 11 23 13
29 1                              1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 5 5 5 12 24
30 1                              1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 5 13
  
Appendix B - Functional Specification of Payoffs 
 
The real payoff function for all players i is:  
2*)(1
1
PP
H
ii
i −++=π
*
iP
 
The table below shows the best reply for player i and the parameter H for every feasible 
average price of the other players iP− k. Note that P , k ∈  {A, B, C}, is the price in equilibrium 
A, B, or C, respectively. kπ , k  {A, B, C}, is the real profit in equilibrium A, B, or C, 
respectively. Recall from Table 1 that P
∈
A = 4, PB = 10, PC = 27, πA = 28, πB = 5 and πC = 21. 
For example, if iP−  is below PA – 1, player i’s best reply is given by 1+−iP 5 and H = −Aπ . 
The real payoff matrix is based on the payoff function above but all numbers in the matrix are 
rounded to integers.  
 
Table B1: Real payoffs 
If the average price of other 
firms is in the range  
player i’s best reply is 
given by  
*
iP and the parameter H is 
given by 
         1−<− Ai PP  1+−iP 5−A π  
      11 +≤≤− − AiA PPP AP 1−A  π  
      BiA PPP <+ −<1  1−−iP  iP−+α2  
 Bi PP =− BP 1−B  π  
          1−<< − CiB PPP  1+−iP  α−4  
     11 +≤≤− − CiC PPP CP 1−C  π  
                 1+>− Ci PP  1−−iP  α−3  
  where: iP−−=10α  
 
  
Table 3: Evolution of Prices and Real Payoffs over Time 
 
 Average Price Average real payoff 
 Human opponents Computerized 
opponents  
Human opponents Computerized 
opponents 
period Real  
(RH) 
Nominal 
(NH) 
Real 
(RC) 
Nominal 
(NC) 
Real  
(RH) 
Nominal 
(NH) 
Real 
(RC) 
Nominal 
(NC) 
1 8.4 20.1 8.3 17.3 8.9 2.9 21.3 13.1 
2 6.6 20.9 7.4 19.0 13.9 5.3 22.3 15.5 
3 5.2 21.9 7.3 18.3 19.5 6.3 21.7 15.3 
4 4.6 22.2 7.7 17.3 22.5 6.0 25.4 18.1 
5 4.1 22.7 8.9 15.5 24.0 6.7 25.5 21.8 
6 4.0 23.1 9.0 14.4 25.1 8.0 23.8 21.4 
7 3.9 23.4 6.0 15.3 26.6 10.6 26.8 22.6 
8 4.1 23.9 6.0 14.4 25.4 10.9 25.5 23.9 
9 4.3 23.9 7.0 11.6 24.7 11.4 27.1 22.1 
10 4.4 24.0 9.7 12.5 24.0 12.3 23.8 23.1 
11 4.0 24.1 6.8 12.4 26.5 11.5 25.4 24.1 
12 4.0 24.0 6.0 12.3 27.1 11.9 26.8 23.1 
13 4.4 24.1 7.2 12.8 24.4 13.6 25.1 23.6 
14 4.9 24.2 7.0 12.5 21.6 13.5 25.7 24.5 
15 3.9 24.1 5.1 13.4 26.9 14.1 26.6 25.1 
16 3.9 24.5 6.8 10.5 26.3 15.4 25.7 24.6 
17 3.9 25.1 6.0 8.6 26.9 15.1 26.4 24.5 
18 4.2 24.9 8.0 9.2 25.4 13.8 26.3 26.4 
19 3.9 25.3 7.3 9.2 26.7 15.2 25.0 25.2 
20 3.9 26.0 6.0 9.3 27.3 16.9 26.8 26.0 
21 4.0 25.1 6.0 9.7 27.1 13.6 26.0 24.7 
22 3.9 26.1 7.0 9.6 27.0 16.0 27.0 23.6 
23 4.0 26.4 6.0 7.9 27.1 16.9 26.7 24.5 
24 4.0 26.6 7.0 8.7 26.8 15.3 27.0 25.4 
25 3.9 27.1 6.0 8.2 27.1 17.2 26.7 24.1 
26 4.0 27.2 6.0 8.0 27.3 19.1 27.4 26.7 
27 3.9 27.1 6.0 8.1 27.5 19.4 27.4 25.9 
28 3.9 26.7 8.0 8.2 27.5 18.0 27.0 26.3 
29 3.9 26.8 6.0 8.3 27.5 18.4 26.8 26.7 
30 3.9 26.4 7.0 8.2 27.5 17.8 27.4 25.9 
 Table 4: Percentage of subjects choosing equilibrium action PA (i.e. Pareto-dominant equilibrium) 
 
       Human opponents Computerized opponents 
period Real  
(RH) 
Nominal 
(NH) 
Real 
(RC) 
Nominal 
(NC) 
1 63.5 0.0 (18.2)* 65.2 22.7 
2 59.6 0.0  (9.1) 69.6 22.7 
3 65.4 0.0 (10.4) 65.2 27.3 
4 78.8 0.0 (14.3) 78.3 31.8 
5 80.8 0.0 (14.3) 73.9 45.5 
6 86.5 0.0 (15.6) 69.6 45.5 
7 94.2 0.0 (26.0) 87.0 45.5 
8 92.3 0.0 (28.6) 82.6 54.5 
9 94.2 0.0 (33.8) 87.0 54.5 
10 92.3 0.0 (37.7) 69.6 59.1 
11 92.3 0.0 (42.9) 82.6 63.6 
12 96.2 0.0 (48.1) 87.0 59.1 
13 92.3 0.0 (46.8) 78.3 59.1 
14 92.3 0.0 (50.6) 82.6 63.6 
15 94.2 0.0 (48.1) 87.0 59.1 
16 90.4 0.0 (49.4) 82.6 68.2 
17 94.2 0.0 (57.1) 87.0 72.7 
18 94.2 0.0 (58.4) 82.6 77.3 
19 94.2 0.0 (59.7) 73.9 77.3 
20 96.2 0.0 (67.5) 87.0 77.3 
21 96.2 0.0 (61.0) 91.3 72.7 
22 94.2 0.0 (66.2) 87.0 72.7 
23 96.2 0.0 (70.1) 91.3 81.8 
24 94.2 0.0 (68.8) 87.0 72.7 
25 96.2 0.0 (71.4) 91.3 81.8 
26 96.2 0.0 (85.7) 91.3 81.8 
27 98.1 0.0 (89.6) 91.3 81.8 
28 98.1 0.0 (85.7) 82.6 81.8 
29 98.1 0.0 (83.1) 91.3 81.8 
30 98.1 0.0 (84.4) 82.6 81.8 
* Numbers in parentheses denote the percentage of subjects choosing the 
equilibrium action PC (i.e., Pareto-dominated equilibrium).  
 
  
Table 5: Statistical significance of treatment differences 
 
period RC vs. NC RC vs. RH NC vs. NH 
1 0.013 0.077 0.609 
2 0.001 0.018 0.401 
3 0.005 0.491 0.951 
4 0.009 0.123 0.950 
5 0.061 0.154 0.531 
6 0.104 0.248 0.192 
7 0.003 0.145 0.603 
8 0.018 0.641 0.295 
9 0.110 0.771 0.005 
10 0.363 0.038 0.019 
11 0.031 0.978 0.033 
12 0.014 0.754 0.006 
13 0.161 0.095 0.015 
14 0.114 0.348 0.006 
15 0.019 0.028 0.015 
16 0.221 0.042 0.002 
17 0.101 0.117 0.000 
18 0.601 0.244 0.000 
19 0.629 0.285 0.000 
20 0.339 0.084 0.000 
21 0.125 0.490 0.001 
22 0.313 0.028 0.000 
23 0.420 0.490 0.000 
24 0.290 0.346 0.000 
25 0.355 0.032 0.000 
26 0.376 0.490 0.000 
27 0.408 0.107 0.000 
28 0.945 0.063 0.000 
29 0.336 0.107 0.000 
30 0.838 0.064 0.000 
Table 5 reports two-tailed p-values of Mann Whitney tests of the null 
hypothesis that average prices are equal across the corresponding 
treatments. Average group prices are the independent units of 
observation.  
  
Figure 1: Average prices and expectations in the treatments with human opponents 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Prices in the nominal treatment with
human opponents (NH)
Expectations in the nominal treatment
with human opponents (NH)
Expectations in the real treatment with
human opponents (RH)
Prices in the real treatment with
human opponents (RH)
 
 
 
 
  
 Figure 2: Average prices across all treatments 
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 Figure 3: Average group prices (treatment NH disaggregated) 
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